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1 Introducing an idea: Facts that call for explanation 
In this chapter, I will introduce an idea and argue that everybody should care about it. 
The conclusion of the book will be that everybody should forget about this same idea. 
You might think that this reversal makes the book a waste of your time, but please do 
not be tempted to toss it in the bin just yet. Getting from the starting point to the 
conclusion is, I believe, a journey worth making. We will examine a very common 
way of reasoning and become aware of its pitfalls, which could have serious 
implications for how we understand the world. Let’s go.  
*** 
An acquaintance of mine became very religious at a certain point in his life. When 
asked what it was that brought about this change, he said:  
There were things that happened to me that I realized just could not be 
coincidences.  
From this realization he drew the conclusion that God exists and intervenes in his life. 
Such thoughts, in one version or another, are very common. Many people believe in 
karma, astrology, lucky days, or lucky objects because they feel that certain events 
can’t be coincidental. I’ve had such experiences myself: Once, when I presented this 
project at a colloquium, I arrived at the lecture hall half an hour in advance to make 
sure that everything was functioning properly, and I discovered that the projector 
wasn’t working. After several failed attempts to get it to work, I went looking for the 
relevant administrator. She turned out to be sick that day. And at just that moment, all 
of the relevant secretaries happened to be out of office. As a result, we had to move to 
a different room, and I started late. Then, in the middle of the lecture, security 
personnel came into the building and told us we had to evacuate immediately due to a 
suspicious object. I have been attending these colloquia for a few years, and none of 
this ever happened to anyone else. As irrational as I believe it to be, I found it difficult 
to resist the conclusion that the universe was against me or was trying to make a 
point. The combination of incidents seemed too much to be coincidental. I am sure 
that you can recall similar thoughts of your own in response to such situations. If you 
can, treat the discussion that follows as an attempt to analyze your own thoughts.  
What precisely does this way of thinking consist in? Is it a good way to think? These 
are the questions that we will explore in this book. 
This way of reasoning can be broken down to two steps: First, the person in question 
makes the claim that a particular fact has some special feature, sometimes described 
by saying that it is “striking” or “calls for explanation.” Second, they make a certain 
inference about the explanation of the fact. Precisely what the inference is varies. It 
might be that the explanation of the fact must be of a certain type, or that the fact is 
unlikely to be “coincidental,” or that some particular explanation must be correct. My 
religious acquaintance, for example, inferred from the things that seemed like they 
couldn’t be coincidences that a providential god exists. In the example from my 
lecture, I inferred from the many events interfering with my talk that the universe was 
intentionally acting against me. My own view is that in these two examples, the 
inferences described, while instinctive, are irrational. Nevertheless, sometimes it is 
rational to believe of certain facts that they are not coincidental.  
If this way of thinking only occurred in laypeople, perhaps it could be dismissed as 
simply another piece of human irrationality. However, it has been used by some of the 
most respected and well-trained thinkers as well, including both religious people and 
atheists. In fact, philosophers have justified some grand conclusions using this kind of 
reasoning. I will explore some of them in the section that follows.     
1.1 Grand conclusions 
Some very influential philosophers have argued for some very grand conclusions 
based on the idea that certain facts call for explanation. In this section, I will describe 
some prominent examples of these arguments.  
In his book Universes (1989), John Leslie explains that our universe has particular 
properties, without which there would be no living beings. For instance, we could not 
have come into existence if entropy had not been extremely low in the Big Bang, if 
the universe had expanded a bit more slowly after the Big Bang, if the strong force 
holding subatomic particles together had been a bit stronger or weaker, etc. This 
collection of facts is referred to as the fine-tuning of the universe for life. Based on 
the assumption that all of these facts represent free variables (i.e., that the strength of 
the strong force, the rate of expansion, etc., could have been anything and just 
happened to be what they are), some cosmologists have attempted to estimate the 
probability of life evolving in our universe. The results suggested in the literature are 







1 These are very small probabilities, barely 
graspable. As a result, Leslie argues that the fine tuning of the universe can’t be a 
coincidence.  
 
1 The first number comes from Smolin (1997, p. 64), the second from Penrose (2004, p. 729). For 
references to more such claims, see Friederich (2017, sec. 1). 
This reasoning is used to support for the idea that the universe was intelligently 
designed. However, if we rule out that possibility for various reasons (chief among 
them being the existence of evil in our world), then we need an alternative 
explanation for the existence of our universe. One such explanation is that our 
universe is only one out of many, many other universes with different initial 
conditions and laws of nature, such that it is no coincidence that one such universe is 
fine tuned for life.2 This theory is often called the Multiverse Hypothesis. Leslie 
contends that this hypothesis is viable and, though he remains agnostic about God, he 
defends the viability of a belief in a Neoplatonic god as another possible explanation 
for the fine-tuning of our universe. He also notes that the two possibilities are 
consistent, so they may both be true.   
Peter van Inwagen (1993, Chapter 8)3 and Roger White (2018) develop Leslie’s style 
of argument into an argument for the existence of God. White summarizes his 
argument as follows:  
1. If a fact E that we observe stands in need of explanation, hypothesis H 
provides a satisfactory explanation of E and one that is better than any 
alternative explanation available, then E provides significant evidential 
support for H. 
2. That our universe is hospitable to life stands in need of explanation.  
 
2 Examples of cosmologists who develop this line of thought are Lee Smolin (1997) and Sean Carroll 
(2010).  
3 Van Inwagen continued to develop his argument in later editions. In those later editions it is less clear 
to what extent the idea of facts calling for explanation plays a role. For his most recent formulation, see 
van Inwagen  (2015, Chapter 9).  
3. That God adjusted the constants in order to allow for life to develop 
provides a satisfactory explanation for why our universe is life-permitting. 
4. There is no comparably satisfying explanation of this fact available.  
5. Therefore, that our universe is life-permitting provides significant evidential 
support for theism. (White, 2018, pp. 29–30) 
The first premise of White’s argument is one version of the idea that this book is 
about. The rest of his argument illustrates how this principle is used to derive far-
reaching conclusions.  
Derek Parfit has endorsed a version of Leslie’s argument as well. In an article 
published in the London Review of Books (1998), Parfit more or less repeats that 
argument (acknowledging his debt to Leslie in a footnote), though he is more 
convinced than Leslie is that theism should be ruled out due to the problem of evil. 
Parfit argues that  
Of the range of possible initial conditions, fewer than one in a billion billion 
would have produced a Universe with the complexity that allows for life. If 
this claim is true, as I shall here assume, there is something that cries out to be 
explained. (Parfit, 1998) 
He claims that this is a reason to believe the Multiverse Hypothesis.  
Thomas Nagel entertained such thoughts as well. In Mind and Cosmos (2012), Nagel 
argues that the existence of conscious beings and of moral knowledge cannot be 
coincidences; they must have an explanation. However, he says that he just cannot 
accept the theistic explanation. Instead, he suggests that we revive an ancient 
Aristotelian idea that there are final causes, or telos, meaning that things happen in 
our world not just because of prior conditions but also for certain ends. It’s as if the 
universe has intentions for the future and does things to bring them about. The 
premise of his argument that interests us is expressed in the following passage:  
[S]ystematic features of the natural world are not coincidences, and I do not 
believe that we can regard them as brute facts not requiring explanation. 
Regularities, patterns, and functional organization call out for explanation—
the more so the more frequent they are. (Nagel 2012) 
These are all versions of fine-tuning arguments, arguments from the fine-tuning of our 
universe for life. They illustrate the grand conclusions that some defend based on the 
assumption that particular facts call for explanation. However, there are many other 
types of argument that reach similarly grand conclusions based on the same 
assumption.  
One such argument was developed by Hartry Field in the context of philosophy of 
math. Field (1989, pp. 25–30) argues against mathematical Platonism—that is, the 
view that there are mind-independent mathematical facts. The version of this view 
that he targets includes a number of commitments. The first is that there are 
mathematical facts that are neither metaphysically grounded in nor caused by our 
beliefs or by any other mental states. Another commitment is that mathematical facts 
are not the types of entities that cause anything to occur; therefore, they do not play a 
causal role in shaping our mathematical beliefs. In addition, these Platonists reject 
skepticism and believe that humans—especially the mathematicians among us—have 
mathematical knowledge. Such non-skepticism implies that there is a massive 
correlation between our beliefs and mathematical facts. This latter commitment, Field 
argues, gives us reason to reject Platonism: 
[T]he correlation between mathematicians’ belief states and the mathematical 
facts… is so striking as to demand explanation; it is not the sort of fact that is 
comfortably taken as brute. (Field 1989, 26) 
Field argues that Platonists are committed to the existence of a striking correlation, 
one that there are two principled reasons to believe cannot be explained. First, we do 
not have at present such an explanation. Second, the supposed correlating components 
are causally and metaphysically independent of one another. Thus, Platonism implies 
that there is a striking correlation that demands explanation, but at the same time it 
seems to imply that no such explanation exists. This, Field argues, is a significant 
reason to reject Platonism.  
The argument can be summarized as follows:  
(1) Non skeptical mathematical Platonism implies that there is a massive 
correlation between our mathematical beliefs and the mind-independent, 
causally inefficacious mathematical facts.  
(2) This massive correlation is striking, it calls for explanation.  
(3) We have principled reasons to believe that if Mathematical Platonism is true 
then the correlation does not have the kind of explanation that is called for.  
(4) If a theory implies that there is a fact that calls for explanation but the same 
theory implies that there are principled reasons to believe that the explanation 
called for does not exist, that is a reason to reject the theory in question. 
(5) Therefore, we have a reason to reject non skeptical mathematical Platonism.  
This argument is known as the reliability challenge to mathematical Platonism,4 or 
the Benacerraf-Field argument, because Field presents it as a development of an 
earlier argument presented by Paul Benacerraf (1973). Field’s argument is considered 
to be one of the most important in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, and yet 
one of its core premises—that there are facts that call for explanation—has 
surprisingly received little attention.5  
More recently, philosophers have applied Field’s argument to other theories with 
similar features. Sharon Street has developed a similar attack against robust moral 
realism, the view that there are mind-independent moral facts. Like Field’s argument, 
her argument rests on the idea that realists are committed to a correlation between our 
beliefs and mind-independent truths. Street argues that such a correlation calls for 
explanation but that realists lack the ability to provide one:  
There is a striking coincidence between the normative judgments we human 
beings think are true, and the normative judgments that evolutionary forces 
pushed us in the direction of making. I claim that the realist about normativity 
owes us an explanation of this striking fact, but has none. (Street 2008)6 
 
4 Often, reliability and knowledge are thought to require a correlation across a set of close possible 
worlds in addition to the actual world. Field does not present it this way, however, and I will stay close 
to his presentation. As far as I can tell, nothing in my argument hinges on this issue.  
5 That’s not to say that it hasn’t received any attention at all. Within local debates, philosophers have 
made local remarks about whether some fact needs explaining and how it might be explained. But they 
do not amount to a general and comprehensive treatment of the idea that there are facts that call for 
explanation.  
6 The argument is further elaborated in Street (2016). In other writings (Street, 2006, 2015), she 
develops her argument against moral realism somewhat differently, relying less on Field’s style of 
argument.  
David Enoch (2009, 2011, Chapter 7) argues that this reliability challenge is the most 
troubling epistemological challenge to robust realism about normativity.  
Joshua Schechter (2010, 2018) develops a similar challenge with regard to our 
knowledge of logic. Schechter argues that  
[O]ur possession of a reliable deductive mechanism is a striking fact. It “calls 
out” for explanation. Ceteris paribus, it is a cost of a theory if it treats striking 
phenomena… as merely accidental or otherwise unexplained. So it is a 
significant cost of a view if our possession of a reliable cognitive mechanism 
is left unexplained. (Schechter, 2010, p. 447) 
Schechter is less decisive than Field and Street as to the proper conclusion of his 
argument. His conclusion is that something is likely wrong with the theories that yield 
this result—including the theory of our cognitive evolution, the view that we are 
reliable in logic, and the claim that we lack an explanation of our reliability in logic—
but in this article, he doesn’t argue that any one of these claims is more suspect than 
the others. Elsewhere he suggests that the theory of evolution does provide an 
explanation of our reliability in logic (Schechter, 2013). 
Throughout this discussion, you may have noticed a certain difference between these 
reliability arguments and the fine-tuning arguments described earlier. Specifically, 
reliability arguments are typically cast as negative arguments (against Platonism or 
moral realism), whereas the fine-tuning arguments are normally presented as positive 
arguments (for a certain view, such as the existence of a god or of multiple universes). 
Although this difference may seem significant, however, I don’t think that it is—one 
is just the flipside of the other. The fine-tuning arguments are as much arguments for 
theism or multiverse as they are against the single-undesigned-universe hypothesis. 
Likewise, the reliability arguments are as much arguments for fictionalism and 
constructivism as they are arguments against realism. The arguments’ conclusions all 
result from the conviction that a certain fact is unlikely to be coincidental, so we 
should reject theories that imply that it is and favor theories that imply that it is not.  
These are not arguments that just appear out there in the literature and have no real 
impact. Rather, these are among the most hotly debated arguments in the relevant 
fields: philosophy of religion, philosophy of cosmology, philosophy of mind, 
philosophy of mathematics, metaethics, and philosophy of logic. And they all assume 
that certain facts call for explanation, precisely the assumption we will examine and 
challenge in what follows.   
So far, all of the examples explored here address facts that are in one way or another 
extraordinary or remarkable, and the conclusions were all meta-physical (in the sense 
that they go beyond the physical—that is, they go beyond the kinds of questions that 
scientists normally try to answer by empirical means—rather than in the sense of the 
word that refers to the foundational principles of all that is physical). But these are not 
the only examples in the literature. Theorists who argue for these meta-physical 
claims often start by pointing out that the contrast appears in ordinary reasoning. For 
example, a seemingly ordinary coin is tossed 97 times and lands HTHTHT… 
(H=heads; T=tails). That sequence intuitively calls for explanation, and we should 
conclude that it most likely is not the result of chance. However, if a coin is tossed 97 
times and lands in a random-looking sequence HHHTHTHTT… then it would not call 
for explanation. Note, however, that in both cases, the prior probability of the coin 
landing in that particular sequence is extremely low.  
In another such example, you put a bunch of stones in a container and shake them 
around. After a few shakes, you notice that the smaller stones are at the bottom and 
the larger ones on top. You repeat this experiment over and over and get the same 
result every time. You should believe that this result is non-coincidental—that there is 
some nice explanation of why the smaller stones always end up in the bottom. If you 
had no idea what the explanation was, you should think that this fact calls for 
explanation. On the other hand, suppose that you look at a sandbox and notice that the 
grains of sand are placed in some particular way—this grain of sand is over here, and 
that grain of sand over there. Every sandbox is arranged in some particular way that is 
different from that of every other sandbox, and the same is true of the sand box in 
front of you. The fact that it is arranged as it is does not call for explanation. It is 
plausibly coincidental.  
In sum, influential philosophers have argued for substantial claims based on the kind 
of reasoning we will explore in this book—that is, on the basis of some fact that is 
thought to call for explanation.7 They have argued that God exists, that there exist 
many universes other than the one we inhabit, that science should undergo a paradigm 
shift and reintroduce teleological explanations, that there are no mind-independent 
mathematical facts, that there are no mind-independent moral facts, and that 
something is wrong with our understanding of our own knowledge of logic. These are 
very grand conclusions relying on a single kind of assumption. But are the arguments 
sound? What if the assumption on which they are based is false? To figure out 
whether that is the case, we need to understand precisely what this assumption says. 
 
7 There are more examples in the literature. See Bhogal (2020) for an argument against Humeanism 
about laws of nature; Bhogal (n.d.) for an argument against views of modality that leave modal patterns 
unexplained; and Berker (2018) for an argument against the existence of practical reasons for belief.  
We will explore these questions in the sections that follow. First, however, we must 
clarify the terms that we will be using.  
1.2 Facts 
What kinds of things might call for explanation? For my newly religious friend and 
for me on the day of my presentation, what called for explanation were particular 
events that occurred. In fine-tuning arguments, physical constants or the initial 
conditions of our universe call for explanation. In reliability arguments, human 
knowledge of domains such as mathematics or ethics call for explanation. And as we 
will see below, and in more detail in Chapter 3, mathematical theorems can also call 
for explanation as well. We should use language in a way that allows for all of these 
possibilities. Therefore, in this book I will talk about facts that call for explanation.  
“Facts” seems to me a more inclusive term than “occurrences,” “events,” “states of 
affairs,” or “phenomena,” all of which appear in previous literature as the term used to 
describe that which calls for explanation. Such terms are not always appropriate—it 
does not seem appropriate, for example, to call mathematical facts “events” or “states 
of affairs.” In contrast, for every event that actually occurred, it does seem right to say 
that it is a fact that the event occurred. Furthermore, the explanation of the event is 
identical to the explanation of the fact that the event occurred. It also seems right to 
say of any state of affairs that obtains that it is a fact that the state of affairs obtains. 
Furthermore, the explanation of why the state of affairs obtains is identical to the 
explanation of the fact that the state of affairs obtains. And it also seems right to say 
that, as a matter of fact, something appears one way or another (which is one way of 
using the term “phenomenon”). Furthermore, the explanation of why something 
appears some way is identical to the explanation of the fact that it appears as it does. 
Therefore, I will refer to all of the things that can call for explanation as facts.8  
There are, of course, different views about what precisely facts are. As I’m using the 
term, every true proposition corresponds to a fact. However, I am hesitant to say that 
the proposition just is the fact because a proposition is an abstract entity. Propositions 
are the meanings of certain sentences (the sentences that can be true or false) or the 
thoughts or contents expressed by such sentences. I don’t think the thoughts are what 
call out for explanation; rather, it is the facts that correspond to those propositions—or 
the facts that make those propositions true—that need explaining.  
To help illustrate what I mean, here’s a sentence in English: “Whenever I press a 
certain button in my office, the light in my office turns on.” Here’s another sentence 
in English: “The light turns on in my office whenever I press a certain button.” 
Although these are two different sentences, they express the same proposition. 
However, what might call out for explanation is not the proposition—rather, what 
might call out for explanation is the fact that the light turns on in my office whenever 
I press a certain button.  
On my use, “the fact that” is a hyperintensional expression. Two facts can be distinct 
even if there is no possible world in which one holds and the other does not. For 
example, the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 is distinct from the fact that 1/89=0.01 + 0.001 + 
0.0002 + 0.00003 + 0.000005 + 0.0000008… (keep adding a 0 and the next number in 
the Fibonacci sequence). The former doesn’t call for explanation in the way that the 
latter does—even though both are necessary truths, true in all possible worlds.  
 
8 I did not do so in some of my previous work. I have since realized that this was a mistake.   
What precisely it means for something to be a fact, though, is not the topic of this 
book, nor is anything here dependent on my way of using this term—my intention is 
simply to explain what I mean when I use it. Throughout this book the explananda 
will be facts. If you have a different theory of facts, such that this use of the term 
would not satisfy you, you are welcome to mentally replace it with whatever you see 
as more fit for the task.  
1.3 Disambiguation 
The term “calling for explanation” and correlates such as “needs explanation” or 
“cries for explanation” are used in more than one way. When people say that a certain 
fact calls for explanation or that a certain hypothesis would call for explanation if it 
were true, sometimes they are referring to a psychological phenomenon. These people 
mean that a certain fact gives rise to a feeling of curiosity or an interest in discovering 
an explanation for it.9 Who is it that becomes curious about the explanation of some 
fact? Perhaps the curious party is simply the speaker, though I suspect that it is 
typically meant to be a claim about a broader group of people, like scientists in a 
certain field. Suppose E (as in explanandum) is one such fact. The first psychological 
meaning of “E calls for explanation” is: 
(1) Psychological sense (descriptive):  E gives rise to a sense of curiosity and 
interest in discovering what the explanation of E is.  
As this psychological sense of calling for explanation has been stated, it is a 
descriptive claim about whether E actually gives rise to curiosity. But this is not the 
 
9 Example: Grimm’s (2008) discussion of facts that need explanation focuses on this sense of curiosity. 
Liquin and Lombrozo (2020) present empirical work on this kind of curiosity, which they call 
explanation-seeking-curiosity.   
only psychological sense of calling for explanation. Another, which is not about when 
E actually gives rise to curiosity, is about when E ought (broadly speaking) to make 
one curious. There are different kinds of normativity associated with such affects, and 
one that has been widely discussed recently focuses on when and why such attitudes 
are fitting (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000). This yields the following sense of calling for 
explanation:  
(2) Psychological sense (normative): It is fitting to be curious and interested in 
discovering an explanation for E (perhaps a certain kind of explanation). 
Both senses of calling for explanation might vary significantly from one person to 
another, though in different ways. People’s actual dispositions vary, so it’s clear how 
actual psychological attitudes might vary from one person to another. The fittingness 
version, however, is normative, and to the extent that norms can be objective, the 
fittingness of curiosity might be as well. Still, all should agree that the fittingness of 
attitudes tends to be context sensitive, so at the very least they are sensitive to one’s 
evidential state; they are often also sensitive to one’s goals.  
Normally, there is an epistemic precondition to having fitting curiosity. The 
precondition is that at present one does not possess (i.e., justifiably believe) an 
explanation for the given fact consistent with one’s background assumptions about the 
world. Let us call this set of background assumptions A. Sometimes when people say 
that fact E calls for explanation, they mean to imply that 
(3) Privative explanatory sense: Given a set of background assumptions about 
the world A, we currently lack an explanation for E. 
Other times, people imply more than just that we lack an explanation. “E calls for 
explanation” can also be used to imply the following:  
(4) Practical sense: Given a set of background assumptions about the world A, 
we have reason to seek an explanation for E.10  
Of course, in order for you to have some reason to invest in discovering the 
explanation for some fact, you need to have reason to believe that you have some 
chance of succeeding. But that is a relatively low bar to clear.11  
None of these senses or implications of calling for explanation would fit as a premise 
in the fine-tuning and reliability arguments presented above (§1.1). In these 
arguments, claiming that a fact calls for explanation amounts to a claim with a more 
salient epistemic significance. That a fact calls for explanation is used to confirm or 
disconfirm theories. When these philosophers say that E calls for explanation, they are 
implying the following kind of claim: 
(5) Epistemic sense: We have an epistemic reason to believe that E has a 
special kind of explanation. 
Why special, and what does that mean? We will get to those questions shortly. For the 
moment, simply note that when calling for explanation is used in this last way, it is 
 
10 Example: Wong and Yudell (2015) seem to use “need for explanation” in this sense, since they 
conceive of it as a reason for action. 
11 Later in this book, I discuss William D’Alessandro’s (2020) recent in-depth case study of a theorem 
in mathematics that is thought by mathematicians to call for explanation. He takes as a sign for calling 
for explanation the fact that ever since the theorem was discovered in the 18th century, mathematicians 
have searched for new proofs with the hope of finding more illuminating proofs. What is not clear from 
the discussion is precisely what those mathematicians thought. Did they think they had reason to expect 
an explanation of a certain type? Or, without having expectations one way or another, did they try to 
find such an explanation because if they would discover such an explanation, it would be illuminating?  
used as a reason to reject theories that imply that E does not have the relevant kind of 
explanation.  
It is only this last sense of calls for explanation that can justify the inferences that 
interest us in this book. When Leslie, White, and Parfit argue that the fine-tuning of 
our universe calls for explanation, they use that argument to reject the theory that says 
that there exists only a single universe and that it came about by chance. When Field, 
Street, and Schechter argue that our knowledge of mathematics, morality, and logic 
calls for explanation, they are using that assumption to argue against realist theories 
that seem to imply that our knowledge is coincidental.  
To clarify, I do not mean to say that these authors use the term “calls for explanation” 
such that it just means what epistemic sense says. Suppose we knew for certain that a 
particular fact had a special explanation, and we knew what that explanation was—it 
would seem weird to say that that fact calls for explanation. At least typically, people 
don’t use the term “calls for explanation” to describe facts for which they have the 
explanation, even when they have reason to believe that those facts have a special 
explanation.12 Whether this is a matter of pragmatics or semantics and what exactly 
governs the use of “calling for explanation” are questions I will return to later in the 
book (Chapter 6). All I want to claim here is that whatever else calling for explanation 
might imply, what is important for the arguments I am interested in is a claim of the 
kind described by reason for belief.  
 
12 However, I have come across people with different linguistic intuitions about this. Taking a firm 
stand on whether a fact for which we know an explanation “calls for explanation” will not be essential 
to any of my arguments. 
In some examples, several of the meanings (1–5) apply. For example, imagine a coin 
that is tossed many times and lands consistently in the alternating sequence 
HTHTHT… The result would likely give rise to emotions of curiosity and surprise, 
and fittingly so. We would also not know what the explanation is for this occurrence, 
and we would have reason to seek such an explanation. Finally, we should infer that 
the fact that the coin landed in this sequence is not coincidental. There is a special 
explanation for why it landed thus, perhaps some mechanism that, on each toss, 
makes it land on the opposite side of the previous toss. This is an example of a fact 
that would call for explanation in all of the aforementioned senses of the phrase—and 
examples like this might be partly responsible for blurring the distinctions between 
them. However, the different meanings of calling for explanation are logically 
independent, and, as I will shortly illustrate, there are cases in which only some of 
them apply. It is therefore important to distinguish between them.  
The lack of clarity in what sense of the term is being used has led to confusion. A 
noteworthy example appears in the philosophy of physics, where there is a 
longstanding debate about whether a hypothesized past state of the universe calls for 
explanation. Huw Price has long argued that it does; Craig Callender argues that it 
doesn’t. Upon examination, however, it turns out that they are actually talking past 
each other rather than disagreeing. Their views turn out to be compatible—they are 
just using “calling for explanation” in different ways.13   
To explain this debate more fully, here is some background: The second law of 
thermodynamics says that the entropy (roughly, the degree of orderliness) of a closed 
 
13 My analysis of the Price-Callender debate is based on joint work with Orly Shenker (Baras & 
Shenker, 2020). There, we provide more background and also use our insights to examine some of the 
arguments provided by different sides of the debate.  
system will always increase until it reaches equilibrium. This law turns out not to be a 
fundamental law of nature but is explained by statistical mechanics as a statistical 
regularity. To explain the current non-equilibrium state of our universe, physicists 
have thought it necessary to hypothesize that in the distant past—perhaps at the 
universe’s beginning—our universe was at a much lower level of entropy than it 
currently is in (and its current state is already low). The same probability measures 
from statistical mechanics that are used to explain why entropy tends to increase 
imply that that past state of low entropy is exceedingly improbable. This hypothesis is 
often called the Past Hypothesis, and the state that it posits is referred to as the Past 
State. The question is whether the fact that our universe was in such an exceedingly 
low level of entropy—especially considering how improbable it is—is a fact that calls 
for explanation.   
In his book entitled Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point (1997, pp. 22–48), Price 
started advocating the view that the Past State needs explanation.  His main claim 
there is that we lack an explanation for the Past State. At the end of the book, he 
summarizes his view contrastively: “What needs to be explained is the low-entropy 
past, not the high-entropy future” (p. 262). Why, in his view, does the low-entropy 
past need explanation but not the high-entropy future? As his argument makes clear, 
the fact that entropy was low in the past is the fact that we lack an explanation for, 
whereas the fact that entropy has been increasing ever since is (assumed to be) well-
explained by statistical mechanics.  
Consider now a quote from Price’s later article. Price explains that the past state of 
low entropy should be equated with the smoothness of the universe shortly after the 
Big Bang (Price, 2002, p. 114). Then he argues:  
Initial smoothness calls for explanation…Would it really be plausible to 
suggest that physicists should sit on their hands and not even try to explain 
it?... [T]he issue is whether it is appropriate to try. (Price 2002, 115)14  
The claim presented here is a practical one: It is worthwhile for physicists to try to 
come up with an explanation of the Past State, and they should devote their time and 
other resources to this project.15 
Callender never disputes that we lack an explanation for the past state, nor does he 
dispute that it may be worth trying to devise one. Consider the following quote from 
Callender, in which he compares the case of the Past Hypothesis with a case 
concerning the standard model in particle physics. As Callender describes it, some 
physicists feel that certain elements of the “standard model” are ad-hoc, and there is 
an ongoing debate on whether these elements should be endorsed as “brute facts” or 
whether they call for explanation: 
[As with the Past Hypothesis] it seems to me that it’s perfectly within the 
rights of the physicist to find something ugly about the standard model and 
want to devise an alternative without so many knobs. When that alternative 
exists and is shown to be empirically adequate, we can then compare the two. 
It may well be that it is superior in various empirical (one would hope) and 
theoretical ways. (Callender 2004b, 248) 
 
14 Price (2004, 230) repeats this claim using similar wording. 
15 Note that this was probably what Price intended to imply in the 1997 book as well, 
although he is not explicit there. Otherwise, what is the point of his argument that the Past 
State is currently unexplained?  
Although Callender clearly claims that we don’t know in advance whether the Past 
State has an explanation, he concedes that it is possible that physicists will be able to 
either come up with such an explanation or devise a better theory without the Past 
Hypothesis. That means that he believes that it is possible that the Past State has an 
explanation and that it is possible that we will discover the explanation. He doesn’t go 
so far as to say that it is a worthwhile project to try to discover this explanation, but 
once he made the other two concessions, it is difficult to reject the claim that it is 
worth the effort. 
Then in what sense does Callender argue that the Past State does not call for 
explanation? Callender summarizes his view thus, in his abstract:  
For the generalizations of thermodynamics to obtain, it appears that a very 
‘special’ initial condition of the universe is required. Is this initial condition 
itself in need of explanation? I argue that it is not… I urge the view that it is 
not always a serious mark against a theory that it must posit an ‘improbable’ 
initial condition. (Callender 2004a, 195) 
The quote suggests that Callender’s imagined interlocutor believes that it counts 
against a theory if it includes the Past Hypothesis and implies that the Past State is a 
brute fact. Interestingly, however, even though Callender’s articles are presented as 
responding to Price, Price, to the best of my knowledge, nowhere endorses the view 
against which Callender is arguing. Callender’s claim is that the Past State does not 
give us reason to reject theories that leave it unexplained, a claim that Price might 
agree with.  
The lesson to be learned from this section is that people use the term “calls for 
explanation” and its cognates to express a variety of claims, but not all of those claims 
are the subject of this book. Here we are interested in a very particular kind of claim: 
the claim that a certain fact is unlikely to be the result of coincidence,16 and that this is 
a reason to reject background theories that imply the contrary.  
1.4 An intermediate view that everybody should accept 
The view we are exploring contains a background assumption: that there are certain 
facts that call for explanation and other facts that do not call for explanation. And for 
this view to do any epistemic work, a further assumption is needed: that at least 
sometimes we can identify which is which. This view can be understood as an 
intermediate view between two extremes, one of which is the view that all facts call 
for explanation and the other of which is that no facts call for explanation. In a related 
discussion, Robert Nozick (1981, p. 121) helpfully distinguishes between egalitarian 
and inegalitarian theories of what requires explanation. The two extreme views just 
presented are egalitarian in the sense that they treat all facts alike, whereas the 
intermediate view—that some facts call for explanation and some do not—is 
inegalitarian. The egalitarianism of the extreme views is an attractive feature of those 
views, and a pertinent challenge to the inegalitarian view asks why it does not treat all 
facts alike. That is, why, in that view, do some facts call for explanation and others do 
not?17  
A nice illustration of each of these three views is presented by considering the 
existence of our universe. Does the existence of our universe call for explanation? 
One view is that no matter what the universe is or could be like, its existence would 
 
16 To be clear, “result of coincidence” is a somewhat figurative way of talking. It is not meant to imply 
that coincidence can be a cause of events.  
17 See Della Rocca (2010) for a related argument for the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). I will 
discuss the PSR shortly.   
call for explanation. Cosmological arguments for the existence of God seem to 
assume as much (though I will soon qualify this claim). These arguments say that the 
mere fact that a universe exists is unlikely to be unexplainable, and that this is a 
reason to believe that God exists. On the other extreme lies the view that the existence 
of our universe, no matter what its features are, does not call for explanation. 
According to this view, no matter how special our universe may be, the fact that it 
exists is no reason to posit God or anything else to explain it. These are the two 
extreme—and egalitarian—views.  
The intermediate view is the one that motivates fine-tuning arguments. Fine-tuning 
arguments are premised on the idea that there is something very special about our 
universe, such as that it is fine-tuned for the emergence of life. Different versions 
focus on slightly different special features of our universe, such as the existence of 
planets or the existence of conscious beings. The basic idea, however, is the same: 
They say that because our universe is fine-tuned, we should believe that its existence 
is non-coincidental, and as a result they posit the existence of God or of multiple 
universes. If it were not fine-tuned, we would not be theoretically forced to make such 
an inference.   
Having outlined the extreme and the intermediate views, I have to address whether 
anybody actually accepts the egalitarian views. I used to think that I could list 
adherents of each one of the extreme views,18 but now I believe that doing so is a 
 
18 I considered adherents of the Principle of Sufficient reason as adherents of the view that all facts call 
for explanation. I will explain shortly why doing so is a mistake. I also interpreted the skeptical claims 
of Callender (2004), Gould (1985, 395), Scriven (1966, 129), and Shanks (2004, 216) (I thank Neil 
Manson for most of these references) about fine-tuning arguments as implying the view that no facts 
call for explanation. The reasons I will cite shortly to think that nobody should accept such an extreme 
view have made me reread these texts and realize that the claims of these authors are either too vague 
mistake. Working through my mistakes will be instructive and help us understand the 
theoretical terrain more clearly.  
Let’s start with the extreme view that all facts call for explanation: This view seems, 
at first, similar to the view known as the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), which 
says that everything that exists has an explanation (i.e., a sufficient reason) for its 
existence. The principle of sufficient reason is most famously associated with Leibniz, 
although it has had earlier adherents (Melamed & Lin, 2016). One known problem 
with the PSR is that it entails an infinite explanatory regress. You can’t just posit, for 
instance, that God created our universe and then you’re done. The existence of God 
itself must have an explanation, and that explanation will itself require an explanation, 
and so on, ad infinitum. Leibniz and others have their responses, such as that God is 
somehow self-explanatory (what explains the existence of God? The existence of 
God. What then explains the existence of God? Again, the existence of God. And so 
on), and that seems to appease some people. Nowadays, the PSR has for the most part 
fallen out of fashion, but it nevertheless has had a bit of a revival. Recent proponents 
of the principle of sufficient reason include Michael Della Rocca (2010) and 
Alexander Pruss (2006). 
(As a side note, personally, I do not find the PSR compelling. Leibniz seemed to have 
thought that the PSR was just obvious, whereas to me it seems obvious that there must 
be some brute facts. However, it is difficult to argue about what seems obvious 
because the answer is subjective. All I can do is report what seems obvious to me and 
let you judge for yourself what seems obvious to you.) 
 
or too specifically about fine-tuning to infer from them any general view about whether any facts call 
for explanation.  
Be that as it may, contrary to its initial appearance as similar to the extreme view that 
all facts call for explanation, the PSR might actually be compatible with the 
“intermediate” view examined here. Why? Because the PSR says that everything has 
an explanation, but it doesn’t say that everything must have some particular kind of 
explanation. True, proponents of the intermediate view typically do not explain what 
kind of explanation is called for when a fact calls for explanation. However, they 
motivate their view using examples, and those examples suggest that they have in 
mind something different from what PSR proponents have in mind, as I will now 
illustrate.   
Let us consider a paradigmatic example, which adherents of the intermediate view 
would consider as not calling for explanation; we will then consider whether the PSR 
conflicts with their judgment. Suppose that a coin is tossed many times and lands in a 
random-looking sequence, such as HTTTTHTTHHHHHTTHTT… Proponents of the 
intermediate view say that this kind of fact does not call for explanation, whereas the 
PSR implies that it has an explanation. So far so good. Suppose the following kind of 
explanation was considered: The coin was tossed the first time at a particular velocity 
v1 from a particular position p1, and, given the laws of mechanics and the structure of 
the surrounding space, it landed heads. On the second toss, it was tossed at velocity v2 
from position p2, so, given the laws of mechanics and the structure of the space, it 
landed tails. And so on for each of the remaining tosses. Let us call this kind of 
explanation a highly conjunctive explanation, because it is a conjunction of many 
seemingly independent facts. Now we should ask: When PSR theorists say that 
everything has an explanation, would this sort of conjunctive explanation count? And 
when people who endorse the intermediate view say that the sequence does not call 
for explanation, did they not expect that this sort of conjunctive explanation would be 
available? One natural answer to the latter question is that when people say that the 
sequence calls for explanation, they are not referring to this kind of explanation. This 
highly conjunctive explanation would still imply that the sequence is coincidental in 
the relevant sense.  
In other words, when people say that some facts call for explanation, they don’t mean 
just any kind of explanation—they mean some special kind of explanation. In Chapter 
4, we will explore this thought in depth and seek out an account for the relevant 
special kind of explanation. Additionally, it may be that when PSR says that 
everything has an explanation, it should be understood as saying that everything has 
some explanation or other, not necessarily a special explanation. According to these 
interpretations, then, the PSR is compatible with the view that there are some facts 
that don’t call for explanation. A PSR theorist can consistently believe that everything 
has an explanation and that some things have special explanations. According to this 
view, we should believe that every fact has some explanation or other and that only 
some facts have a special explanation.19  
How about the view that nothing calls for explanation? On a plausible interpretation, 
this would amount to the claim that we never have reason to believe that some fact or 
 
19 Michael Friedman might seem to endorse the view that all facts call for explanation, when he says 
that “all phenomena, from the commonest everyday event to the most abstract processes of modern 
physics, are equally in need of explanation” (Friedman, 1974, p. 13). However, the context is not 
calling for explanation in the epistemic sense we focus on in this book. Friedman is concerned with the 
question of what makes something a scientific explanation. In this passage, he’s arguing against the 
view that “the phenomenon doing the explaining must [be]… self-explanatory or natural. Such 
phenomena need no explanation; they represent ideals of intelligibility. Explanation…consists in 
relating other phenomena to such ideals of intelligibility” (Friedman, 1974, pp. 11–12). It is an 
interesting question precisely what the relationship might be between this debate about what constitutes 
an explanation and our question here about certain inferences.  
other has a special explanation. This is a view that nobody should endorse. Everybody 
should accept that we can have some evidence that some fact or other has a special 
explanation. Here’s an example: You’re walking around campus and see students 
gathering at a certain location. You wonder, is it a coincidence that students are 
gathering there, or is there some special explanation for that fact? You ask a friend, 
who tells you that there’s a special explanation, and presumably she knows what’s 
going on. In such a situation, who could deny that you have a reason—namely, your 
friend’s testimony—to believe that the fact that the students are gathering has a 
special explanation?20  
Here’s another example: Suppose I’m showing you some magic tricks. I pull out a 
deck of cards and let you pick any card you like. You pick the ace of hearts. Then I 
ask you to return the card to the deck, and I shuffle the deck a few times, throw the 
deck on the ground, and keep one card in my hand—the ace of hearts. Should you 
believe that the fact that the card in my hand is the one you chose at the beginning is 
non-coincidental? Of course you should. You should believe that the magician 
somehow manipulated the cards. Furthermore, it seems more like the kind of 
explanation we would expect of facts that call for explanation than like a highly 
conjunctive physical explanation. And in the context of a magic show, who could 
deny such a claim? Nobody should accept the view that there can’t be any reasons to 
believe that some fact has a special explanation. Thus, everybody should accept the 
 
20 You might object that in the example it seems unnatural to think of the fact as calling for 
explanation. If so, one might claim that what this example really illustrates is that calling for 
explanation doesn’t just mean having reason to believe that a fact has a special explanation, and one 
can have reason to expect a special explanation for a fact that doesn’t call for explanation. I actually 
believe there is something to this objection. However, for now, I’ll have to keep you in suspense until 
Section 6.1.3, where I argue that the intuition grounding this objection fits well with the view I develop 
there.   
intermediate view. And in that case, then in this book we are exploring a view that 
nobody should reject.  
That isn’t to say that nothing here is or can reasonably be in dispute. What might be 
disputed is what kinds of good reasons there are to believe that certain facts have 
special explanations, and what sorts of special explanations we have reason to expect 
in such cases. Perhaps there are some kinds of reasons that some people believe to be 
good ones, and others disagree. In fact, authors who at first glance seem to hold the 
view that nothing calls for explanation are often actually making claims about 
particular kinds of reasons that, in their view, aren’t good reasons to believe that a 
given fact is non-coincidental. For the remainder of this section, we will examine two 
such kinds of reasons.  
1.4.1 A priori calling for explanation 
The first of these is a priori reasons—that is, reasons based solely on thinking, without 
supporting observations. There might be dispute about whether you can ever have a 
priori justification to believe that a purported fact calls for explanation.21 There are 
some general disputes about a priori justification, and of course anyone who doubts 
our ability to have any a priori justification should also doubt that we can be justified 
a priori in believing that some purported fact calls for explanation. However, suppose 
we assume that we can have some a priori justification, and then we ask whether there 
can be a priori reason to believe that a purported fact calls for explanation. To answer 
this question, consider mathematical beliefs, which are commonly thought to be 
paradigms of a priori justified beliefs. If this description of such beliefs is accurate, 
 
21 For a related point with references, see Nozick (1981, p. 121) about whether we can know a priori 
which is the “natural fact” that doesn’t require explanation.   
then given that mathematical facts can call for explanation (see Section 3.3 for 
examples), there should be no further dispute about whether it is possible to be 
justified a priori in believing of a fact that it calls for explanation.  
Further, I argue that this reasoning applies not only to mathematical facts but to other 
kinds as well. For example, it seems in principle possible to justify a priori a 
hypothetical claim about a fact calling for explanation. It’s true that for any empirical 
fact—say, the fact that when you put ice in warm water, the ice will melt—you 
obviously can’t a priori justify the belief that there is a fact f that calls for explanation 
because you can’t a priori justify the belief that f is the case. You must first observe 
ice melting in warm water (possibly even more than once) in order to be justified in 
believing that the fact that ice melts in warm water must have a certain kind of 
explanation. Even if you never observed ice melting in warm water, however, you can 
be justified in believing that <were ice to melt in warm water, that would be a fact that 
would call for explanation>. Now it might be true that whether ice melting in warm 
water calls for explanation depends partly on certain background information. That, 
too, can be built into an a priori hypothetical: You would still be justified in believing 
a priori that were you to have the relevant background information and were you to 
know that ice melted in warm water, you should believe that it calls for explanation. 
More generally, we can be justified a priori in believing of hypothetical empirical 
facts that they would hypothetically call for explanation. For any fact that would call 
for explanation, if we were justified in believing that it was a fact, then we should be 
justified in believing a priori that it would call for explanation if it were a fact and if 
we had all the evidence that we actually have. That hypothetical empirical facts can 
hypothetically call for explanation is a second reason to think that facts can call for 
explanation a priori.  
1.4.2 Isolated calling for explanation 
The second possible disagreement about reasons for calling for explanation is whether 
facts can ever call for explanation in isolation, that is, independently of background 
information. Roger White thinks that a question like this was a matter of dispute 
between David Hume and William Paley, both of whom famously develop 
teleological arguments for the existence of God. Having developed his argument, 
Hume then criticizes it, and some think that Paley, in developing his own version, was 
trying to avoid Hume’s critique.  
Paley (1802, p. 1) has us consider what we should believe were we to find a watch in 
a heath and Hume (1779, Chapter 2) considers similar examples. The two authors 
agree that in such a case, you should conclude that the watch did not just appear there 
fully formed without a designer. But why should we make this inference? White 
thinks there is a disagreement here between Hume and Paley. According to Hume, 
what justifies the inference is the fact that the watch in the heath is similar to many 
other watches we have observed or heard about, and we know that those other 
watches were intentionally crafted—thus, we infer that this watch, too, was 
intentionally crafted. Paley is less clear about the justification for this inference, 
which opens the door to speculation about his way of justifying it. White speculates 
that “[a]ccording to Paley, even someone who had never seen a piece of machinery 
even remotely like a watch could rationally judge that the watch had a designer” 
(White, 2014, p. 306). Setting aside Paley’s theistic conclusion, we can wonder 
whether a watch in a heath would call for explanation even if we had no prior 
information about any piece of machinery like a watch. White thinks that it would—
and attributes this view to Paley. Hume, however, does not.  
Let us think a bit more about the Paley–White view that, sometimes, whether a fact 
calls for explanation can be determined by the fact itself in isolation. The view, to be 
even initially attractive, needs some qualification: If we know the explanation for a 
fact, then it seems wrong to say that it calls for explanation. But whether we know the 
explanation is about us, not about the fact. Therefore, there is an obvious sense in 
which whether a fact calls for explanation always depends on background 
information. However, this really is an unimportant quibble. One way to get around it 
is to say that what we’re interested in is whether there are ever facts for which we 
have an initial pro tanto reason to believe that they have a special explanation. Such a 
pro tanto reason can be outweighed or screened off, such as when we have 
overwhelming reasons to believe of a certain explanation that it is true. If that certain 
explanation is not a special explanation, but being outweighed or screened off doesn’t 
mean that the pro tanto reason doesn’t exist.22 It’s true that in such a case, we 
wouldn’t say that the fact calls for explanation, but we’re not interested here in what 
we would say. What we are exploring in this book is a certain kind of reason for 
belief, and such a reason can exist even when it is outweighed or screened off.  
Are there other problems with the Paley–White view? I once thought I had a good 
argument against it. I now believe it can be resisted. Let's work through that 
argument. Consider a paradigmatic example of a fact that would not call for 
explanation: A die is tossed a number of times and lands 42321261124654416224. 
For any such case, it seems that we can imagine circumstances in which the same fact 
 
22 If the explanation that we have overwhelming reason to believe is not a special explanation, then 
whatever pro tanto reason we had to believe that there is a special explanation is outweighed. If 
however the explanation we should believe is of the special kind, the pro tanto reason isn’t outweighed. 
Instead, it just becomes insignificant or screened off in the sense that even without it we would have 
come to the same conclusion, so it might no longer seem worth mentioning.  
would call for explanation. For example, suppose that a few minutes before tossing 
the dice, I wrote in my notebook “42321261124654416224”. Then I toss the die, and 
lo and behold, it lands 42321261124654416224. Now it seems that the same fact—
that a die landed 42321261124654416224—would call for explanation, and this is 
partly in virtue of a different fact—that I wrote this same number in my notebook a 
few moments earlier. The example seems generalizable. That is, it seems that for any 
purported fact that would not call for explanation in some circumstance, I can think of 
a different circumstance in which the same fact would call for explanation. And this 
seemed to me to support the view that whether a fact calls for explanation is always 
partly determined by background facts.  
However, this argument fails for two reasons. First, what such examples demonstrate 
at most is that facts that in themselves would not call for explanation can call for 
explanation in conjunction with other facts. The examples do not show that there are 
no cases in which a fact does call for explanation in isolation. What we would need in 
order to demonstrate the latter claim is a generalizable example in the other 
direction—that is, a fact that seems to call for explanation, but when we subtract 
certain background facts, it no longer does so. The second reason that this argument 
fails is that there is an alternative and appealing way to describe what it is that calls 
for explanation in the second scenario: What calls for explanation is not the fact that a 
die landed 42321261124654416224 but rather the fact that a die landed in the exact 
same long and random-looking sequence as was written earlier in a notebook. This is 
a different fact. And it is a fact that requires a separate argument to show that it 
doesn’t call for explanation in isolation.23  
Take, then, a paradigmatic fact that does call for explanation—say, a die landing 
123456123456. Would it call for explanation if this were the only fact we knew? The 
more I think about what it would involve to have this be the only fact we knew, the 
more it seems to me that the fact itself would not call for explanation. It would have to 
be a scenario in which you had no basic experience of the laws of physics, no idea 
about how dice normally fall, and no idea even that anything falls or what falling is.24 
This is a difficult and perhaps even impossible scenario to imagine. We have never in 
our lives found ourselves knowing so little that we have too little experience to draw 
upon when trying to imagine this scenario. And this leads me to two conclusions 
regarding the Paley-White view. First, we do not have any good reason, as far as 
intuitions about examples go, to believe that facts can call for explanation in isolation. 
Second, in practice, our reasoning is never conducted in isolation. It therefore does 
not seem to matter to our actual reasoning whether facts can call for explanation in 
isolation. 
The conclusion of this subsection is that the intermediate view, that some facts call for 
explanation and some do not, is a view that everybody should accept. We examined 
two possibilities for disagreement about what kinds of reasons there are for facts to 
call for explanation, a priori reasons and isolated reasons. I argued that there should 
 
23 I thank Oded Na’aman and others for pressing me with this challenge a few times until I finally 
decided that they might be right.  
24 Would you know that these are consecutive numbers? If not, surely it wouldn’t call for explanation. I 
believe, though, that the fact that these are consecutive numbers should be thought of as part of the 
fact—that is, part of what calls for explanation.  
not be much disagreement about them either. If there are any a priori reasons for 
belief, then there are also a priori reason to believe that facts call for explanation. And 
we lack any reason to think that facts call for explanation in isolation.  
1.5 A naïve picture and a project 
Let us recap what we have learned in this chapter. The thought that some facts call for 
explanation is a common one, and it plays a role in important philosophical 
arguments. For example, it is used to reject mathematical Platonism and moral 
realism, as well as to support theism and multiverse theories. In these contexts, the 
term “calls for explanation” is used to make the claim that we have reason to believe 
that a certain fact has a special kind of explanation. I then argued that everyone should 
accept the view that some facts call for explanation.  
This idea can be formulated as a principle, which serves as a premise in arguments of 
the style described in this chapter. For ease of reference, it will be helpful to give the 
principle a name. I will therefore call it the striking principle. The reason is that the 
idea that when facts call for explanation is sometimes expressed by saying that those 
facts are “striking.”25 The striking principle consists of two claims:  
(1) There is a property that some facts have more than others, strikingness, which 
determines the fact’s degree of calling for explanation.  
(2) To the extent that a purported fact E is striking, we have reason to believe that 
it has an explanation of a special kind.   
The striking principle appeals to a property, “strikingness,” that some facts have and 
to an “explanation of a special kind.” These terms are place holders that a theory of 
 
25 Another reason is that I find the principle itself a bit striking. 
calling for explanation will have to define. That is, we want to know in virtue of 
which property facts call for explanation and, when they do so, precisely what kind of 
explanation do they call for.  
We will explore this way of thinking about calling for explanation in the next few 
chapters. It is represented in the following picture:   
 
The blue person is us, looking around and noticing properties of various facts, 
represented by the blobs of paint. Some facts have the property of calling for 
explanation and some do not. It is as if facts are painted by different colors—those 
painted black call for explanation, and those painted orange do not. When we come 
across a fact that calls for explanation, we infer that it probably has another property, 
namely that its explanation must be of a special kind; for other facts, we make no such 
inference. The black arrows represent the striking principle, which is the rule of 
inference that allows us to infer from a striking fact that there is a special explanation.  
I call this way of thinking the naïve picture. It is a way of thinking rather than a thesis 
because so long as no definition is provided for “striking” and “special explanation,” 
it lacks enough substance to rule in or out any particular instances of reasoning. 
Indeed, as I explain in the beginning of Chapter 3, there is a way of filling in the 
details that makes the principle trivial. Thus, what we have here is not a substantive 
thesis, but rather a certain way to approach our topic—a scheme waiting to be filled 
in.  
This picture—this way of thinking—suggests a philosophical project, which is to 
figure out three things. First, what is the property of strikingness? Second, what is the 
special kind of explanation that we should expect striking facts to have? Third, what 
is the nature of the striking principle that connects the two? We will engage with the 
first two questions in Chapters 3 and 4 and with the third in Chapters 2 and 5. 
Ultimately, the project reaches a dead end, which suggests that there should be a 
different way of thinking about calling for explanation. That’s why I call the initial 
picture naïve—it is naïve in comparison to a better alternative, developed in the 
concluding chapter of this book (Chapter 6).  
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